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ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN: A DEMAND FOR CHANGE
IN ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Candace C. Fetscher
It is characteristic of our legal system that a decision of the highest
court in the land can affect the lowest and most remote courts so
deeply that the complexion of the latter group is substantially altered.
Such is the result in Argersinger v. Hamlin,' decided by the United
States Supreme Court on June 12, 1972. Jon Richard Argersinger, an
indigent tried without benefit of counsel, was convicted of carrying a
concealed weapon, an offense punishable in Florida by up to six months'
imprisonment, a $1,000 fine, or both.2  Reversing the conviction sus-
tained by the Florida supreme court,3 the Court through Mr. Justice
Douglas held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person
may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, mis-
demeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial."
'4
This decision, bottomed on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, 5
ended a decade's uncertainty about the scope of an indigent's con-
stitutional right to appointed counsel. This note will attempt to explore
the ramifications of the Argersinger decision and the problems that it
may raise for a jurisdiction such as Montana.
GENEOLOGY OF INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Recognition of a right to court-appointed counsel has been gradual,6
beginning with its extension to persons charged with capital offenses
in Powell v. Alabama,7 in 1932. Six years later in Johnson v. Zerbst
8
counsel was required for anyone who might potentially be deprived of
life or liberty as a result of prosecution in a federal court. The 1942
holding in Betts v. Brady9 refused to extend the Johnson rule to state
1Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
'FLORIDA STATUTES ANNOTATED, § 790.01(1) (1969).
8State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1970).
'Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra note 1 at 37.
'U.S. Const. amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
amend. XIV:
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
'See Note, 7 U. RicH. L. REv. 349, 350 (1972).
7Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).
'Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
'Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942).
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courts. Instead, Betts held that the right to court-appointed counsel
should be extended to those charged with felonies in state courts only
if the special circumstances of the case required counsel to insure a
fair trial.'0 The "special circumstances" rule persisted until it was over-
ruled by Gideon v. Wainwright" in 1962. Since Gideon, counsel has
been required for any defendant charged with a felony in either state
or federal court. Unfortunately, the Gideon court did not delineate the
boundaries of the right, and clarification awaited other decisions which
held that counsel must be provided during interrogation,1 2 during
lineup,' 3 during a preliminary hearing, 14 on appeal, 15 and during revo-
cation hearings.' 6 It was not until 1967 that the right to court-appointed
counsel was extended to juveniles.
1 7
During the years following the Gideon decision, the Court on three
occasions refused to rule on the question of the right to court-appointed
counsel for indigents charged with misdemeanors.' 8 The states took
several divergent approaches: nine provided counsel for most mis-
demeanors, twenty-two extended counsel only for specific misdemeanors,
and nineteen had no requirements for counsel at all.19 It is significant
that during these years the Court, over the objections of Mr. Justice
Black,20 refused to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment automatically
extended Sixth Amendment rights to defendants charged in state courts.
Many of these rights, however, such as the right to trial by jury,
2'
have been specifically recognized in separate decisions. The Argersinger
decision went further than those before it, viewing the right to counsel
as one of the fundamental requisities of a fair trial.
22
'ld. at 462.
"Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962).
12Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964); Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S.
436, 474 (1966).
13United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-238 (1967).
"Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
15Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
'"Memphis v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135-136 (1967).
17In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967). Also see Note, 77 DICK. L. REv. 176, 177 (1972)
for a discussion of the expansion of the right to counsel.
2sDe Joseph v. Connecticut, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 982 (1966); Cortinez v. Flournoy,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 925 (1966); Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966). See also
DICK L. REV., supra note 17.
"0 For an analysis of each state's approach after Gideon see Allison and Phelps, Can
We Afford to Provide Trial Counsel for the Indigent in Misdemeanor Cases?, 13 Wm.
& MARY L. REV. 75, 94-105 (1971).
10Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947), dissent of Mr. Justice Black;
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1967), Mr. Justice Black concurring at 165 as
follows:
The historical appendix to my Adamson dissent leaves no doubt in my mind
that both its sponsors and those who opposed it believed the Fourteenth Amend-
ment made the first eight Amendments of the Constitution (the Bill of Rights)
applicable to the states.
But see Mr. Justice White writing for the Court in Duncan at 149.
nDuncan v. Louisiana, supra note 20.
2Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra note 1 at 31; see also Note, DICK. L. REV., supra note
17 at 180, commenting as follows:
[Vol. 35
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Even before Argersinger, lower federal courts and state courts on
the basis of federal and state constitutions, upheld the right of an
indigent misdemeanant to have the benefit of counsel. For example,
in 1967 the California supreme court upheld a habeas corpus petition
from an indigent misdemeanant in the following language:
Under article I, section 13, of the California Constitution,' there
can be no doubt that the fundamental right to the assistance of
counsel is guaranteed to all persons, such as the present petitioner,
charged with a misdemeanor in a justice or other inferior court....
This guarantee, of course, is meaningless unless the defendant
is made fully aware of it: not only must he be advised of his right
to counsel, he must also be advised that the court will appoint an
attorney to represent him if he is unable to afford one."
Shortly after Argersinger, in Herndon v. Superintendent, Virginia
State Farm,25 the federal district court in the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia wrote:
On March 10, 1971, subsequent to Herndon's conviction, this court
decided Marston v. Oliver, 324 F.Supp. 671 (E.D. Va. 1971), wherein
the court ruled that the denial of appointed counsel to an accused
indigent misdemeanant who requested same rendered the conviction
therein constitutionally defective. Subsequently, in June, 1972, the
Supreme Court reached the same result in Argersinger v. Hamlin
rpm
A similar result obtained in Alexander v. City of Anchorage,27 but
in that case the court went beyond requiring counsel in the face of
incarceration, extending that right to defendants facing a possible loss
of valuable license or even a heavy fine.28  This holding appears to
agree with some of the reservations expressed by Mr. Justice Powell
in his opinion concurring in the result of Argersinger.
29
"In refusing to use the right to jury trial standard to circumscribe the right
to counsel, the Court deemed the right to counsel a more fundamental constitu-
tional right. Reviewing the language of Powell and Gideon, the Court reiterated
its position that the 'assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very exist-
ence of a fair trial'.''
2CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13:
In criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever, the party accused shall have the
right to a speedy and public trial and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense; to have the process of the court to compel the attendance of witnesses
in his behalf and to be personally present with counsel. No person shall be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense; nor be compelled, in any criminal case,
to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; but in any criminal case, whether the defendant
testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence
or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by
counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury. The Legislature shall
have power to require the defendant in a felony case to have the assistance of
counsel. The Legislature also shall have power to provide for the taking, in the pres-
ence of the party accused and his counsel, of depositions of witnesses in criminal
cases, other than cases of homicide when there is reason to believe that the wit-
ness, from inability or other cause, will not attend at the trial. (As amended
June 6, 1972.)
"1In re Smiley, 427 P.2d 179, 184, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1967).
"Herndon v. Superintendent, Virginia State Farm, 351 F. Supp. 1356 (E.D. Vir. 1972).
"Herndon, supra note 25 at 1357.
2Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910 (Alask. 1971).
2id. at 916.
5 Argersinger, supra note 1 at 44-46.
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ARGERSINGER IN SHORT: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROBLEMS
The Argersinger decision was unanimous. The entire court agreed
that failure to provide counsel for a defendant unable to provide it
himself was equivalent to a denial of equal protection and a denial of
due process based on wealth. This clarification of the extent of consti-
tutional right to counsel is welcomed by a legal profession and especially
a judiciary which was, by its own admission, making its best guesses
at the Supreme Court's probable eventual holding in the area.30 This
decision was also heartily welcomed by proponents of that legal phil-
osophy which sees the assistance of counsel as an indispensable means
of attaining justice.31
While agreeing with the laudable result achieved by Argersinger,
Mr. Justice Powell, joined by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, points out what
appear to be some very real problems in its application.3 2 These prob-
lems primarily involve lack of finances and manpower, but also reach
the question of how far Argersinger itself should be extended. For ex-
ample, Powell points out that there is no constitutional basis for dis-
tinguishing between deprivations of liberty and property under the
due process clause. 33 He mentions non-prison sentences potentially more
harmful to the recipient than short-term incarceration (e.g., loss of
licenses). Furthermore, Powell raises the question of adequately achiev-
ing justice under the new rule. He questions the fairness of pre-judging
(or pre-sentencing) a defendant in order to decide whether to appoint
counsel,3 4 and also the possibility that within the same jurisdiction
different judges might or might not wish to preserve a prison-sentence
option by appointing counsel. In the latter event, two defendants
80State ex rel Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra note 3 at 443:
In this confusing situation we feel that we have no alternative but to adopt
the decision of the federal court of this judicial district that we feel most nearly
approximates any decision in this respect that might be adopted by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
,At page 36 of Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra note 1, Mr. Justice Douglas referred to
Preliminary Report 1 (1970) of the American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Counsel
for Misdemeanants: "One study concluded that '(m)isdemeanants represented by
attorneys are five times as likely to emerge from police court with all charges dis-
missed as are defendants who face similar charges without counsel.' '' See also Note,
55 IowA L. REv. 1248 (1970) at 1262:
High rates of guilty pleas do not, however, prove a lack of desire for counsel.
In fact, the high rates of guilty pleas may be the result of not having counsel.
Legal advice may be most important for the defendant who intends to plead
guilty, as the ramifications of a guilty plea may be of more consequence than
just the fine..."
"Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra note 1.
R1d. at 52.
8'Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra at 55; see also Junker, The Bight to Cousel in Misde-
meanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV. 685 at 709 (1968):
How certain can a judge be, if he has not prejudged the case, that imprisonment
may or may not be imposed? Must he not know, according to modern notions of
individualized sentencing, facts that he ought not know prior to the adjudication
of the defendant's guilt or innocence?
[Vol. 35
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accused of the same offense in the same jurisdiction would receive
different potential sentences before their trials even began.35
Finally, Powell expresses some concern for the courts' ability to
preserve the crime-deterrent objective of sentencing under the Arger-
singer rule. He writes:
If a judge has predetermined that no imprisonment will be imposed
with respect to a particular category of cases, the indigent who
is convicted will often receive no meaningful sentence. The defend-
ant who can pay a $100 fine, and does so, will have responded to
the sentence in accordance with law, whereas the indigent who
commits the identical offense may pay no penalty. Nor would
there be any deterrent against the repetition of similar offenses
by indigents."
ARGERSINGER IN MONTANA
As mentioned earlier, a constitutionally-based decision such as Arger-
singer reverberates to the farthest corners of the nation and affects
the administration of justice in the most remote municipal and justice
courts. Montana is a good place to look at the practical effects of the
Argersinger requirement of appointed counsel; Argersinger and its pred-
ecessors may also pose some special problems for this state due to
previously existing law.
Since the enactment of the Montana Code of Criminal Procedure
37
in 1967, Montana has required the appointment of counsel for indigents
accused of felonies and has permitted the appointment of counsel for
indigent misdemeanants at the court's discretion. 38 This right may be
waived, except in the case of a minor accused of a felony.39 In 1962,
counsel was regularly offered to persons charged with misdemeanors and
did not prove to be prohibitively expensive,40 perhaps because few
misdemeanants availed themselves of this assistance. At that time it
was recommended that counsel "be assigned to defend indigent persons
in all criminal proceedings."'41 [emphasis added]. After Argersinger, if
a jail sentence of any kind is to be imposed, counsel must be appointed.
The time has come to recognize this requirement in the courts and the
MSee Note, 24 MERCER L. REV. 497 (1972) for expansion of this potential problem.
"Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra note 1 at 55.
87Laws of Montana (1967), Ch. 196.
wREvIsED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 95-1001 (hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947):
Every defendant brought before the court must be informed by the court that
it is his right to have counsel before proceeding and must be asked if he desires
the aid of counsel. The defendant, if charged with a felony, must be advised
that counsel will be furnished at state expense if he is unable to employ counsel.
If the offense charged is a felony and if the defendant desires counsel and is
unable to employ counsel a court of record must. assign counsel to defend him.
If the offense charged is a misdemeanor and if the defendant desires counsel
and is unable to employ counsel a court of record, in the interest of justice,
may assign counsel to defend him.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1002.
"Elison, Assigned Counsel in Montana, 26 MONT. L. REV. 1, 4 (1964). See also 3
SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR, 425, 436 (1965).
"'SILVERSTEIN, supra note 40 at 436.
19-74]
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legislature. Changes must be made not only in Right to Counsel sections
of the Code, 42 but also in R.C.M. 1947, § 95-2302(b) which provides for
detention in lieu of an imposed fine at the rate of $10 per day.43 This
statute, questionable after Spinler v. Ellsworth,4 4 appears to be uncon-
stitutional as applied to an indigent defendant since Tate v. Short,45 in
which the United States Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Brennan, re-
versed a habeas corpus denial on the basis that the petitioner (convicted
of accumulated traffic offenses) was "subject to imprisonment solely
because of his indigency.
' '46
What does all of this import for Montana? It means that even
the traffic offender sentenced to fifty dollars or five days can escape
punishment on proof of indigency. It means, perhaps, a parade of indi-
gent misdemeanants to district courts seeking appointment of counsel
in situations where more solvent offenders currently waive counsel and
merely pay the fine. Montana's situation is further complicated by the
fact that execution of judgment is limited by R.C.M. 1947, § 9
5 -2008 (a), 47
to the sentencing jurisdiction. Even read with R.C.M. 1947, § 95-
"-R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1001 et. seq.
R.C.M. 1947, § 95-2302 reads in part:
(a) If the judgment is for a fine alone, execution may issue thereon as on a
judgment in a civil case.
(b) If the defendant must be committed to the custody of the proper officer,
and by him detained until the judgment is complied with. The imprisonment must
not exceed one day for every ten dollars ($10.00) of the fine.
"Spindler v. Ellsworth, 152 Mont. 69, 446 P.2d 429 (1968). Petitioner, convicted of
delivering a fraudulent check-while out on bond for a similar offense-was sentenced
to three years and a $3,000 fine, which, due to indigency was sentenced to be served
at $2 per day. The court held that jail term could be imposed in default of fine, but,
it amended the sentence making the petitioner eligible for parole as if the fine por-
tion of the sentence were nonexistent.
"Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
"Id. at 398. Tate further extended the holding in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235,
244 (1969), that "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substantive offense be the
same for all defendants irrespective of their economic status.''
'7R.C.M. 1947, § 2008 reads as follows:
Execution of Judgment. (a) The judgment must be executed by the sheriff,
constable, marshal or policeman of the jurisdiction in which the conviction was
had. (b) When a judgment of imprisonment is entered, a certified copy thereof
must be delivered to the sheriff or other officer, which is a sufficient warrant
for its execution. (c) If a judgment is rendered imposing a fine only, without
imprisonment for non-payment, and the defendant is not detained for any other
legal cause, he must be discharged as soon as the judgment is given.
A judgment that the defendant pay a fine may also direct that he be imprisoned
until the fine be satisfied, in the proportion of one (1) day's imprisonment for
every ten dollars ($10.00) of the fine. When such a judgment is rendered the
defendant must be held in custody the time specified in the judgment, unless
the fine is sooner paid. (d). Any officer charged with the collection of fines,
under the provisions of this chapter, must return the execution to the judge
within thirty (30) days from its delivery to him, and pay over to the judge the
money collected therefrom, deducting his fees for the collection.
All fines imposed and collected by a justice or police court must be paid to the
treasurer of the county, city or town as the case may be, within thirty (30) days
after the receipt of the same, and the justice or police judge must take duplicate
receipts therefor, one (1) of which he must deposit with the county or city or
town clerk as the case may be. 6
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2302(a), 48 which provides that execution can issue on a fine as on a
civil judgment, Montana provides no sanction against the convicted
transient 49 indigent misdemeanant.5 0  Once sentence has been passed,
without defense counsel, proof of indigency in response to a fine leaves
the court with no alternatives at all.
Certainly, Argersinger represents a major accomplishment in the
area of due process and equal protection, but the cost of that accomplish-
ment may be very great, especially in a predominantly rural state such
as Montana. Rough guidelines for judicial procedure were set in Arger-
singer itself. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote, "Under the rule we announce
today, every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts
that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it,
unless the accused is represented by counsel." 51 Mr. Justice Brennan,
concurring in the result, added:
Because no individual can be imprisoned unless he is represented
by counsel, the trial judge and the prosecutor will have to engage
in a predictive evaluation of each case to determine whether there
is a significant likelihood that, if the defendant is convicted, the
trial judge will sentence him to a jail term. The judge can preserve
the option of a jail sentence only by offering counsel to any defend-
ant unable to retain counsel on his own."
Judges should now know that counsel must be offered at the
outset to indigents, even those charged with misdemeanors, if there is
any possibility that a term of imprisonment might be imposed. This is
particularly true since Tate unless the judge has already determined that
he will impose only a fine as sentence in the event of a guilty plea or
conviction. Here the practical problems begin. R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1001
provides that a court of record may appoint counsel. Thus, a justice
-R.C.M. 1947, § 95-2302 Execution of a Fine, reads in part as follows: " (a) If the
judgment is for a fine alone, execution may issue thereon as on a judgment in a
civil case. ''
'"Transient" is used here to denote the defendant who is or can readily become
sufficiently mobile to remove himself and his goods from the sentencing jurisdiction.
The question of whether a writ of execution directed to the sheriff of another county
ordering him to levy on property in his county creates a lien there was answered in
Merchants Credit Service Bank, Inc. v. Choteau County Bank, 112 Mont. 229, 114
P.2d 1074, 1076-1077 (1941):
No statute can be found in our legislative Acts that authorizes a sheriff to
serve a writ of execution directed to the sheriff of another county. A sheriff's
power to serve a writ is derived from a writ addressed to himself. Outside his
own bailiwick a sheriff has no more power to serve process than a private citizen.
The writ served on the defendant could be legally served only by the sheriff of
Cascade county, or his duly authorized deputy, and legal levy on property there-
under could be made only in Cascade county.
5 Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra note 1 at 40.
uArgersinger v. Hamlin, supra note 1 at 42. See also Leising and Icenogle, Criminal
Law-Sixth Amendment Bight to Court-Appointed Counsel for Indigents, 47 Tui. L.
REV. 446, 455 (1973):
If the likelihood of imprisonment appears strong, the judge may preserve his
sentencing option only by appointing counsel; if the likelihood appears remote
and appointment of counsel is not made, then regardless of the subsequent evi-
dence presented and the punishment prescribed by law, a defendant may not be
incarcerated.
7
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or police court, not being a court of record, 53 must request an appoint-
ment from the district court if there is any contemplation of a possible
jail sentence. Even the paper work involved on the part of the district
courts in this event would be burdensome. Staff would have to be em-
ployed to investigate the veracity of the claim of indigency 54 as well
as to process appointments of counsel. It is, of course, conceivable that
much of this work could be handled through a public defender's office, 55
or that a law could be enacted empowering the justice and police courts
to appoint counsel for indigent misdemeanants if there were no avail-
able public defender. If this approach were adopted, it would be wise
to provide for cooperation between the justice and police court judges
and local bar associations, since many of these judges are not members
of the bar and therefore do not enjoy the same relationship that has
traditionally existed between bench and bar.
R.C.M. 1947, § 95-100656 should be amended to allow municipal gov-
ernments to provide for the office of public defender if they so desire;
this power is presently limited to counties and could prove to be an
unneessary area of controversy between the two units of local govern-
ment. Another welcome legislative response to the problems raised by
Argersinger would be some kind of specific provision empowering offi-
cials of any county to enforce executions adjudged in other counties.
There appears to be no constitutional bar to this kind of action, and
it would considerably simplify the collection of fines from transient
offenders.
Other jurisdictions have experimented with means of dealing with
the problems created by Argersinger: how to finance equal justice for
all and how to adequately enforce the criminal law against all offenders.
Several methods are suggested by Mr. Justice Douglas, and also by Mr.
Justice Brennan and Mr. Chief Justice Burger in their Argersinger
opinions. Among these are use of law students as defenders, decriminali-
zation of some offenses to the point that both prosecution and defense
could be handled by para-legal personnel such as clergymen or social
workers (or the whole proceeding overseen by administrative bodies in
the cases of victimless crimes) and finally installment payment of fines.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-102. The courts enumerated in the first three subdivisions of the
last preceding section, and only those courts, are courts of record.
R.C.M. 1947, § 93-101. The following are courts of justice of this state: 1) the court
of impeachment; 2) the supreme court; and 3) the district courts.
t3 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 41 at 427:
Investigation of indigency is more by chance than by plan; unless rebutting
evidence is personally known to the sheriff's. office, the county attorney, or the
judge, the defendant 's own statement of indigency is accepted.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1006 reads in part as follows:
Any county through its board of county commissioners, may provide for the
creation of a public defender's office and the appointment of a salaried public
defender and such assistant public defenders as may be necessary to satisfy the
legal requirements in providing counsel for defendants unable to employ counsel.
the costs of such office shall be at county expense.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1006.
[Vol. 35
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 35 [1974], Iss. 1, Art. 12
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss1/12
NOTES
Some jurisdictions have succeeded in billing former indigents for legal
representation provided for them during their indigency.5 7 This ap-
proach, under Petition of Hunsinger,58 would be unworkable in Mon-
tana without legislation. The Montana supreme court in Hunsinger held
that the county could not impose a lien on the defendant's estate to
recover for the costs of counsel appointed when he appeared to be in-
digent. This approach might also prove to be a great hindrance to re-
habilitation of the habitual offender, adding one more debt to what
might conceivably be a sisyphean burden already carried on account of
the original condition of indigency.
Use of law students in Montana, a state with only one law school,
would not be feasible except during the summer months. The geo-
graphic area of Montana precludes this approach as well as suggesting
great difficulties if the public defender approach were to be employed
cooperatively by several counties.
Finally, any of these approaches are costly; legal manpower is ex-
pensive. On a nation-wide basis, even before Argersinger, a shortage of
practioners in the field of criminal law was noted by the 1966 Confer-
ence on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law.5 9 A year earlier, in
1965, an estimation of annual misdemeanor charges was made at five
million excluding minor traffic offenses.60 Even reduced to correspond
with Montana's population, the potential defense caseload in this area
is staggering.61 The cost might be even more so, especially as viewed
by city and county governments already struggling financially in order
to provide necessary services for their constituents.
CONCLUSION
Philosophically, the Argersinger decision could not be more welcome
in any jurisdiction; financially it may prove to be disastrous. As Mr.
57OREGON REVISED STATUTES, § 161.665 (1962). State v. Fuller,, ...... Ore ....... 504 P.2d
1393, 1397 (1972) held that under the recoupment statute the court could revoke pro-
bation if it found the defendant able to pay without hardship and also intentionally
in default.
Both installment payment and recoupment, however, might further discourage
an indigent offender who felt driven by society to the initial offense.
"Petition of Hunsinger, 153 Mont. 445, 456 P.2d 304 (1969).
"Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law, 41 F.R.D. 389,
394 (1966).
The extent to which the estimated need for 15,000-20,000 lawyers in the adminis-
tration of criminal justice is presently being met was indicated by the estimate
that of the nation's approximately 300,000 lawyers, there are now about 4,000
full-time prosecutors or their equivalent, 400 defenders and between 2,000 and
5,000 lawyers who serve more than occasionally as retained defense counsel. Thus,
the lawyer manpower presently in the field meets less than half the estimated
need.
e'SILVERST.IN, supra note 41 at 10,
'On a nationwide basis it was estimated that,
(t)o provide counsel to all indigent defendants accused of felonies, misdemeanors,
and traffic offenses would require ... the full time services of 13,006 to 13,281
attorneys: 1,014 for felonies, 1,575 to 2,300 for misdemeanors, and 10,417 for
traffic offenses." Note, 55 IowA L. REV. 1248, 1262 (1970).
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Justice Powell points out, "... to require that counsel be furnished
virtually every indigent charged with an imprisonable offense would
be a practical impossibility for many small town courts. The commun-
ity could simply not enforce its own laws. '62 In any event, the trial
court should "make a record, prior to accepting a plea of guilty, advising
the defendant of his right to a jury trial, right to counsel, right to have
counsel appointed for him, if indigent, and in the event that the defend-
ant wishes to waive such right, it must affirmatively appear of record." 63
The legislature could help considerably by enacting the statutory
changes suggested above, facilitating both appointment of counsel and
execution of fines. State funding or sponsorship of defense programs,
whether defender or appointed counsel, should also be considered. It
is clear that a comprehensive study of the administration of criminal
law within the state, including an economic analysis of our ability to
support alternative approaches to criminal justice and a comparative
analysis of the public defender and appointed counsel programs, must
be made. This study will take time, even if begun immediately. In
the meantime, perhaps as a part of the study, experimental programs
should be undertaken throughout the state's courts. Montana must look
to the future as well as to the rules thrust upon us by the past: perhaps,
before we have even provided for indigent criminal defendants we
shall be required to provide for any indigent who, through legal pro-
cess, might be deprived of his property. Argersinger presents problems
which cannot be adequately met by the bench and bar alone. They must
be aided by the legislature and the executive, especially in terms of
funding and program development and administration.
Montana should perhaps begin to consider some radical approaches
for providing for criminal justice such as the proposal considered by
the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs that every defendant be pro-
vided counsel at state expense regardless of financial status and subject
to a right to retain private counsel. 64 At the very least, Argersinger may
introduce some new attitudes into an old system. It might even be argued,
as suggested in the Conference report, that "indigency, and its correlate
charity, may no longer be relevant concepts in the administration of
criminal justice."65
"Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra note 1 at 61.
'Fraizer v. City of Tulsa, 507 P.2d 940, 941 (Okla. 1973).
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